Weberís sociology of inner-worldly mysticism, Almaasí recent synthesis of transpersonal and psychoanalytic object relations theory, and Jungís related metaphorical psychology of alchemy, are brought to bear on the development of Heideggerís evocations of the felt sense of Being between 1927 and 1946, understood as the noetic core of spirituality. In particular, Heideggerís assumption of the Nazi rectorship at Freiburg in 1933ñ34 is seen as a specifically spiritual crisis based on the "metapathological" grandiosity that can result from the miscarriage of self (...) realization in inner-worldly mysticism. In Heideggerís case, as in much contemporary spirituality, this crisis was intensified by pre-existent narcissistic vulnerabilities of character. Heideggerís later writings are considered as expressions of a more genuine spiritual or essential realization, which, while invaluable as a conceptual framework for transpersonal psychology, nonetheless stops short of a balanced personal integration. This analysis constitutes a specific example of how the combination of transpersonal psychology and psychodynamics can be used to understand the emotional conflicts stirred up by transpersonal realization and the resultant potential for distortion in modern spiritual development, as presented by Hunt. (shrink)

"Of the making of many books there is no end" seems reasonable enough when the subject is infinity but after reading this well-organized study one is not so sure; a figure suggested by Zeno speaks of "a fog [which] the incessant labours of modern scholars often cause." Sweeney’s methodology is to use the ever-increasing body of modern critical discussions as a help in interpreting and assessing the presocratic fragments and their ancient commentators. For Anaximander a particularly detailed and nuanced coverage (...) of the literature between 1947 and 1970 is presented-over twenty major interpretations, with supplementary articles treated in an Appendix. Subsequent chapters treat in less detail the positions on infinity of the other Ionians, Pythagoras, the Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. Here the author relies heavily on existing surveys like those of Kirk and Raven and Guthrie. This raises a question about the kind of audience envisaged. To a sentence like "Let us now trace as simply and yet accurately as possible Raven’s views", Raven could be pardoned for reacting with the impression that he had already done just that himself. Much of the book is a perhaps over-leisurely doxography of work written in uncomplicated English, albeit in widely scattered journals; nonetheless Sweeney’s imposing, almost intimidating, coverage of bibliography will save even seasoned ancient philosophers many hours of L'année philologique-hunting and makes his work an important and eminently worthwhile contribution. Apart from some relatively minor misprints there is a serious confusion of Alcmaeon with the poet Alcman. Alcman deserves better treatment in the exegesis of Anaximander’s "rather poetical terms."—T. H. (shrink)

Early in Peter Abelard's Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, the philosopher and the Christian easily come to agreement about what the point of ethics is: “[T]he culmination of true ethics … is gathered together in this: that it reveal where the ultimate good is and by what road we are to arrive there.” They also agree that, since the enjoyment of this ultimate good “comprises true blessedness,” ethics “far surpasses other teachings in both usefulness and worthiness.” (...) As Abelard understood them, both fundamental elements of his twelfth-century ethical culture — Greek philosophy and Christian religion — held a common view of the nature of ethical inquiry, one that was so obvious to them that his characters do not even state it in a fully explicit way. They take for granted, as we take the ground we stand on, the premise that the most important function of ethical theory is to tell you what sort of life is most desirable, or most worth living. That is, the point of ethics is that it is good for you, that it serves your self-interest. (shrink)

Understanding terrestrial carbon metabolism is critical because terrestrial ecosystems play a major role in the global carbon cycle. Furthermore, humans have severely disrupted the carbon cycle in ways that will alter the climate system and directly affect terrestrial metabolism. Changes in terrestrial metabolism may well be as important an indicator of global change as the changing temperature signal. Improving our understanding of the carbon cycle at various spatial and temporal scales will require the integration of multiple, complementary and independent methods (...) that are used by different research communities. Tools such as air sampling networks, inverse numerical methods, and satellite data allow us to study the strength and location of the global- and continental-scale carbon sources and sinks. Bottom-up studies provide estimates of carbon fluxes at finer spatial scales and examine the mechanisms that control fluxes at the ecosystem, landscape, and regional scales. Bottom-up approaches include comparative and process studies that provide the necessary mechanistic information to develop and validate terrestrial biospheric models. An iteration and reiteration of top-down and bottom-up approaches will be necessary to help constrain measurements at various scales. We propose a major international effort to coordinate and lead research programs of global scope of the carbon cycle. (shrink)

Early in Peter Abelard's Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian, the philosopher and the Christian easily come to agreement about what the point of ethics is: “[T]he culmination of true ethics … is gathered together in this: that it reveal where the ultimate good is and by what road we are to arrive there.” They also agree that, since the enjoyment of this ultimate good “comprises true blessedness,” ethics “far surpasses other teachings in both usefulness and worthiness.” (...) As Abelard understood them, both fundamental elements of his twelfth-century ethical culture — Greek philosophy and Christian religion — held a common view of the nature of ethical inquiry, one that was so obvious to them that his characters do not even state it in a fully explicit way. They take for granted, as we take the ground we stand on, the premise that the most important function of ethical theory is to tell you what sort of life is most desirable, or most worth living. That is, the point of ethics is that it is good for you, that it serves your self-interest. (shrink)

"Of the making of many books there is no end" seems reasonable enough when the subject is infinity but after reading this well-organized study one is not so sure; a figure suggested by Zeno speaks of "a fog [which] the incessant labours of modern scholars often cause." Sweeney’s methodology is to use the ever-increasing body of modern critical discussions as a help in interpreting and assessing the presocratic fragments and their ancient commentators. For Anaximander a particularly detailed and nuanced coverage (...) of the literature between 1947 and 1970 is presented-over twenty major interpretations, with supplementary articles treated in an Appendix. Subsequent chapters treat in less detail the positions on infinity of the other Ionians, Pythagoras, the Eleatics, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the Atomists. Here the author relies heavily on existing surveys like those of Kirk and Raven and Guthrie. This raises a question about the kind of audience envisaged. To a sentence like "Let us now trace as simply and yet accurately as possible Raven’s views", Raven could be pardoned for reacting with the impression that he had already done just that himself. Much of the book is a perhaps over-leisurely doxography of work written in uncomplicated English, albeit in widely scattered journals; nonetheless Sweeney’s imposing, almost intimidating, coverage of bibliography will save even seasoned ancient philosophers many hours of L'année philologique-hunting and makes his work an important and eminently worthwhile contribution. Apart from some relatively minor misprints there is a serious confusion of Alcmaeon with the poet Alcman. Alcman deserves better treatment in the exegesis of Anaximander’s "rather poetical terms."—T. H. (shrink)

In False Wisdom, Gary H. Merrill develops criteria for distinguishing genuine from pseudo-philosophy, and then applies his criteria to several case studies, including Ayn Rand, all of whom he finds to be pseudo-philosophers. While offering a mostly helpful overview of better and worse ways of doing philosophy, Merrill fails to motivate adequately his way of distinguishing pseudo-philosophy from mere philosophical vices, errors, or failings. He is inconsistent in his characterization of the criteria for pseudo-philosophy and his application of those criteria, (...) harbors a narrow conception of what counts as philosophy, and displays a lack of interpretive charity toward several thinkers. (shrink)

Suffering evokes moral and metaphysical reflection, the bioethics of suffering concerns the proper ethos of living with suffering. Because empirical and philosophical explorations of suffering are imprisoned in the world of immanent experience, they cannot reach to a transcendent meaning. Even if religious and other narratives concerning the meaning of suffering have no transcendent import, they can have aesthetic and moral significance. This understanding of narratives of suffering and of their custodians has substantial ecumenical implications: chaplains can function as general (...) custodians of narratives and sustainers of a generic religious meaning. This understanding is contrary to traditional Christianity, which discloses a transcendent significance of human suffering found in a very particular history involving particular persons: Christ as the second Adam through the submission of the second Eve has taken on our nature so that we can be united with God. Human suffering is tied to human sin, not simply as a punishment for sin, much less as an opportunity to discharge a supposed temporal punishment due to sin. Human suffering is the result of our rebellious free choices. It provides an opportunity for humility and submission, so that, united to the cross of Christ, sin can be forgiven and suffering set aside in the Resurrection. Knowledge of this framing context for all human suffering is accessible not through rational argument. It is a knowledge garnered through repentance, purification of the heart, illumination by God's grace, and unification with God. Christian bioethics is embedded in the narrative of suffering, which is part of the history of salvation and which encompasses and places all of medicine in its terms. (shrink)

Because sin is anything that turns our heart from God, sins are both voluntary and jnvoluntary. As a consequence, double effect can only be adequately understood in a Christian context in which it is recognized that, even when evil is not willed, our involvement in its causation can still mar our hearts. The acknowledgement of involuntary sins resituates double effect so that the traditional Christian concern with spiritual harm and healing can be maintained. In this way, one can overcome the (...) underdeveloped Western theological appreciation of double effect, which ignores the effect on the heart of causing evil. (shrink)

Rather than revealing itself as a single, unified, ecumenical faith, Christianity is sundered with Christians united neither in one communion nor in one baptism. Christian Bioethics seeks to examine the traditional content-full moral commitments which the Christian faiths bring to life, sexuality, suffering, illness and death within the contexts of medicine and health care. Seeking to understand the differences which separate the bioethics of Roman Catholics, Protestants, and the Orthodox, Christian Bioethics explores the manners in which the faiths diverge. The (...) failure of the Enlightenment project to disclose a content-full communality that would bind mankind has left much to be reconsidered by Christians who face new ethical dilemmas in the novel guise of advances in health care technologies. (shrink)

In the face of the moral pluralism that results from the death of God and the abandonment of a God's eye perspective in secular philosophy, bioethics arose in a context that renders it essentially incapable of giving answers to substantive moral questions, such as concerning the permissibility of abortion, human embryonic stem cell research, euthanasia, etc. Indeed, it is only when bioethics understands its own limitations and those of secular moral philosophy in general can it better appreciate those tasks that (...) it can actually usefully perform in both the clinical and academic setting. It is the task of this paper to understand and reevaluate bioethics by understanding these limits. Academic bioethicists can analyze ideas, concepts, and claims necessary to understanding the moral questions raised in health care, assessing the arguments related to these issues, and provide an understanding of the different moral perspectives on bioethical issues. In the clinical setting, bioethicists can provide legal advice, serve as experts on IRBs, mediating disputes, facilitating decision-making and risk management, and clarifying normative issues. However, understanding this is only possible when one understands the history, genesis, and foundations of bioethics and its inability to provide a resolution to postmodern moral pluralism. (shrink)

This paper presents four different understandings of the family and their concomitant views of the authority of the family in pediatric medical decision making. These different views are grounded in robustly developed, and conflicting, worldviews supported by disparate basic premises about the nature of morality. The traditional worldviews are often found within religious communities that embrace foundational metaphysical premises at odds with the commitments of the liberal account of the family dominant in the secular culture of the West. These disputes (...) are substantial and ultimately irresolvable by sound rational argument because of the failure to share common foundational premises and rules of evidence. It is in light of these fundamental disagreements that there is a need to evaluate critically the claims and agenda advanced by the Convention on the Rights of the Child. (shrink)

Generalized anxiety disorder is among the world’s most prevalent psychiatric disorders and often manifests as persistent and difficult to control apprehension. Despite its prevalence, there is no integrative, formal model of how anxiety and anxiety disorders arise. Here, we offer a perspective derived from the free energy principle; one that shares similarities with established constructs such as learned helplessness. Our account is simple: anxiety can be formalized as learned uncertainty. A biological system, having had persistent uncertainty in its past, will (...) expect uncertainty in its future, irrespective of whether uncertainty truly persists. Despite our account’s intuitive simplicity—which can be illustrated with the mere flip of a coin—it is grounded within the free energy principle and hence situates the formation of anxiety within a broader explanatory framework of biological self-organization and self-evidencing. We conclude that, through conceptualizing anxiety within a framework of working generative models, our perspective might afford novel approaches in the clinical treatment of anxiety and its key symptoms. (shrink)

Marx's critique of political economy as a problem-posing framework Political economy and its critique Writing in the late, Friedrich Engels drew attention ...

A re-examination of the anonymous Commentary on the Theaetetus, henceforth abbreviated K, is overdue. It may yet prove to be the most important document we possess for plotting the course of pre-Plotinian Platonism, and is by far the largest surviving portion of a pre-Plotinian commentary on a complete work of Plato. It offers us insights into the issues of the first century B.C. which are unparalleled in other extant Middle Platonist works, either because of the subject of the work and (...) its consequent tendency to bring to mind the epistemological debates between Philo of Larissa, Antiochus of Ascalon, and Aenesidemus, or because the author, whom we may call A, is writing at a time comparatively close to those debates. (shrink)

This essay provides evidence to support a promising conceptual and potentially practical set of ideas at once both principled and effective found in the work of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz addressed to the issue of ‘adequacy’ as a goal in social research. Efforts to achieve adequacy beyond the epistemological conditions required by Weber’s demand that evidence meet both causal adequacy and adequacy on the level of meaning were significantly refocused by Schutz’s later concern, responding specifically to Weber, that the (...) social sciences also address themselves to his postulate of adequacy. It states that “Each term used in a scientific system referring to human action must be so constructed that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construction would be reasonable and understandable for the actor himself, as well as for his fellow men”. A serious attempt to implement a more expansive notion of adequacy by practically activating this postulate in the ways suggested can be beneficial not only for the social research situation but in everyday life as well. (shrink)